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The Community is well on course for 1992
the year in which the legal and technical
structure of the internal market is to be in
place, ushering in the free movement of
goods, services and capital. It goes without
saying that such a large economic area (the
Community already has over 320 million in"
habitants, a figure which will probably be
nearer 330 million in 1992) needs a blueprint
for a common energy supply. As we shall see
later, this is also what the people of Europe
want. The 'script' for the ambitious internal
market project, the Commission s White
Paper adopted by the European Council in
Milan at the end of June 1985, does not list
energy or energy policy in the section on
planned legislation. (There is an indirect
reference concerning the opening up 
public procurement in the electricity and
water supply sectors.) Nevertheless, the
energy sector occupies a far more important
place in the internal market programme than
might at first appear.
Let us consider again briefly how the new
Article 8a of the EEC Treaty defines the inter-
nal market:
The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty: Is energy a com-
modity? A service? Or both? The prevailing
view is that, while energy is a strategic
economic commodity, energy marketing has
more to do with services.
The internal energy market will therefore in-
evitably differ in some important ways from
the internal market in, say, the food industry
or audiocassette industry. Furthermore, the
individual energy sources are also highly
diverse in character  take water, coal
mineral oil and nuclear energy-and nature
has distributed these resources (which we
shall mainly consider collectively as
primary energy' in the following) less than
evenly throughout the individual Member
States. In addition, energy is used for dif-
ferent purposes: depending on how it is pro-
cessed, an energy product may be used as a
fuel, as a raw material or as motive power. All
of this has given rise to very complex struc-
tures in the individual Member States and, of
course, the structures become even more
complicated atthe level of the Community 
a whole.
However, a superficial glance will suffice to
show that there is little evidence of market
forces in the usual meaning of competing
products and suppliers in the European
energy industry and many ancillary sectors.
For example, there is virtually no alternative
at present to oil in road transport or the
petrochemicals industry. There is at least a
choice of primary energy inputs for heating,
steam raising and blast furnace operation
with cost generally being the deciding factor.
Electricity, the most widely used form of
secondary energy, and natural gas, are com"
monly subject to distribution monopolies
which close off the market in theircatchment
area, denying access to competitors. The
undertakings operating on such markets are
also highly diverse. Small and medium-sized
private companies exist side by side with
public utilities, national private enterprises
and multinational concerns. These organiza-
tional differences are compounded by dif-
ferences in rights, privileges and obligations.
And just to round off the picture, the energy
sector is influenced by different political
traditions in the individual Member States
and, above all, differences in taxation
practice.
The net result is that differences between
Member States in the energy sector are
primarily determined.bytwo factors: the type
of energy products available there and the
conditions under which they are produced
distributed and used. Nature and history
have thus produced a situation where the i n-dividual energy markets in the Community'
Member States are still strictly compartmen-
talized and the free movement of energy pro-
ducts consequently greatly hampered. This
has inevitably had repercussions on the com-
petitiveness both of the individual Member
States and of the Community as a whole in
the international arena.
However, the objective of the internal market
is specifically to secure the Community'
competitiveness and international prestige
in the short  to  medium term. Energy has a key
part to play in this owing to its vital impor-
tance for every sector of the economy and the
individual citizen. It is hoped that a more
open energy market will reduce access
utilization costs and pave the way to more
rational production through greater com-
petition on the supply side. It will not only be
private consumers who benefit, but also in-
dustry wherever it requires energy to func-
tion. If we consider that energy costs amount
to between 25 and 30% of the production
costs of steel, glass products, aluminium or
building materials, it immediately becomes
clear that lower energy prices have a direct
impact on product prices and thus on com-
petitiveness. This results in more oppor-
tunities for stable growth and better pro-
spects for employment.
The effects on the energy industry itself are
also likely to be positive. The removal of in-
ternal barriers should provide the industry
with economies of scale in the production,
transport and distribution of energy. This will
go hand in hand with an improvement in the
European producers' financial situation and
ITI
international market position. Another
crucial aspect is that a more integrated
energy market can decisively improve the
security of supply of the Member States and
their economies. Last but not least, intra-
Community trade in energy products is likely
to increase substantially, and thus reduce
costs still further. These cost factors are by no
means insignificant. The Commission has
put the costs of 'non-Europe' in the energy
sector, i.e. the additional costs that energy
consumers  whether in industry or the
domestic sector - have to bear owing to the
current fragmentation of energy markets, at
almost 0.5 % of the Community gross
domestic product. For this reason alone, we
can but endorse the statement made by the
Commission in its paper of May 1988 en~
titled 'The internal energy market'
: '
The
establishment of a more integrated energy
market is of vital importance to the future of
our Community. We should therefore
endeavour to identify all the potential or ex-
isting obstacles confronting the various
energy sources and the various Member
States.' We shall return to this subject later.
However, there are also objective constraints
acting on all energy sources and all Member
States, independently of any other im-
pediments or barriers they may encounter in-
dividually. These are the security of supply
and the strategic nature of energy generation
and energy products. These constraints were
abruptly revealed during the first oil crisis in
1973. Let us therefore begin with the Com-
munity position in the world energy
market.THE COMMUNITY AND THE WORLD ENERGY
MARKET
The world energy market has changed fun-
damentally since the end of the Second
World War. Several factors have been im-
plicated in this development:
(i) an increase of over 100% in primary
energy consumption in the industrialized
countries in the first three decades up to the
early 1970s;
(ii) large-scale displacement .of solid fuels
(hard coal and lignite), which covered over
80% of energy requirements in the countries
of the future European Community after the
Second World War, by mineral oil and
subsequently, natural gas. Oil, which ac-
counted for approximately 10% of European
energy requirements at the beginning of the
1950s, increased its share to 59% in 1973
while solid fuels declined to 23%' 
(iii) the emergence of .a completely novel
energy source in the form of nuclear power
which covered just 4% of requirements in
1973 together with geothermal energy and
hydropower (now 12%);
(iv) two oil crises in 1973 and 1979-80 which
changed the picture more radically than any
other factor.
A new trend has been emerging as a result of
increased environmental awareness in
broad sections of the population, not only in
Community countries, which has led to
critical questions being asked about the
main energy sources - coal and oil as well
as nuclear energy - and the consequences
of intensive energy utilization in the form of
visible and tangible deterioration of the
natural environment.
Let us now consider these factors in-
dividually:
THE FIGURES
The development of the world economy
since the end of the Second World War has
resulted in an unprecedented expansion of
energy consumption. World consumption in
1950 stood at around 1 900 million tonnes of
oil equivalent (a unit which measures the
various energy sources according to their
equivalent calorific values, so that they can
be compared and added: one tonne of oil
equivalent (toe) corresponds  to  10 million
kilocalories (kcal); 14 years later consump-
tion had already doubled, increasing to a
total of $073.5 million toe by 1988. It is
estimated that man will have used as much
energy in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury as throughout the whole period of his
existence on Earth until 1950. World energy
consumption increased by an average of 
per annum between 1950 and 1973, which is
twice the known rates from the 19th century.
Steady economic growth of well above S%
on average over many years, rapid popula-
tion growth of + 1.9% per annum and
above all, stable energy prices favour~d thi~
trend.
These international trends were faithfully
reflected in Europe. Energy consumption in
1973 in the Community of the Nine reached
approximately 1 000 million toe. Atthattime
it was not possible to foresee that demand in
Europe could become saturated, nor that
there could be zero growth. It is therefore not
surprising that the Commission extrapolated
the existing growth rates to arrive at a pro-
jected energy demand of 1 800 million toe
for 1985; for 1988 it assumed a doubling of
the 1973 figure. It was also predicted that:
(i) the share of solid fuels would continue to
decline to just 10% of demand in 1985;
(ii) the share of natural gas and oil would in-
crease to 15 and 64% respectively in the
same year, and
(iii) there would be a massive expansion in-
nuclear energy from 1.4% in 1973 to about
9% in 1985. IIJ(I)
Europe needs an internal market without frontiers. The single European market needs an energy market
without frontiers.We shall come back to the prognoses later.
Suffice it to say here that none of them was
really borne out. However, one result of the
changes in the relative shares of the various
energy sources was that the Community'
dependence on imports increased
dramatically, as .it had scarcely any oil
resources of its own at the time. As the sharp
increase in energy demand was largely
covered by imported oil, the energy imports
of the Nine temporarily accounted for 65%
of the entire energy requirement. By con-
trast, only 10% of demand had to be covered
from imports in 1950.
. SUPPLY STRUCTURES PRIOR
TO 1973
To sum up the trends outlined above,
Europe s energy situation on the eve of the
first oil crisis was the following.
The inexorable growth in the role of oil as a
source of primary energy had engendered a
structural crisis in the coalfields of the United
Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the
consequences of which have still not been
fully overcome.
Taking a Community view, this development
in fact probably boosted solidarity between
Member States. Owing to the lack of suffi-
cient own oil resources, all Member States
became importers of energy, although to
varying degrees. This led to a change in at-
titudes. Previously, there had been a clear
distinction between those countries which
were able to cover a large proportion of their
energy requirement from own resources
mainly coal, and those which were obliged
to buy in energy from their neighbours.
The substitution of oil for coal as the main
energy source brought with it major shifts in
the location of industry. So long as coal had
a predominant role, it was natural that the
key industries were located in or around the
coalfields. Oil, however, came into the Com-
munity via the ports and coastal areas, and
no longer only in the northwest of the Com-
munity s territory where the oil industry hadhitherto been concentrated. Refineries and
petrochemical plants were set up in the ports
of entry and in the hinterland, leading to
greater economic development in regions far
from the coalfields. However, overcapacities
have arisen in this  sector  at these locations,
which are still creating problems today.
These developments were accompanied by
far-reaching changes in the international
structures of the energy industry. The long
unchallenged position of the multinational
oil companies with their highly integrated
structures - exploration, production, trans-
port, refining, storage and distribution in one
hand  gradually began to crumble. Firstly,
the oil-producing countries were no longer
prepared to accept this domination of the
market and, secondly, opposition also began
to stir in some importing countries.
On the oil-producing side, the founding of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) was primarily responsible
forthis development In 1965, only five years
after the organization was set up, the
changed distribution of forces was reflected
in the imposition by Libya ora new taxation
system on the concession companies, under
threat of a unilateral cut-back in the produc-
tion volume. The importing countries of
Western Europe in particular founded their
own national oil companies with govern-
ment support or, where these already ex-
isted, such as in the Netherlands and Italy, ex-
panded their role. In order to secure max-
imum national independence, these com-
panies had to aim for a similar degree of
vertical' integration - from oil production
through to distribution  as the existing
multinational concerns. They very quickly
expanded their operations beyond national
frontiers.
The new situation also had an impact on rela-
tions with the United States of America. The
USA was able to satisfy its energy demand
from domestic production, or at least from
the American continent This gave it an ad-
vantage over its competitors overseas, at least
for so long as they obtained their oil supplies
The  Community  is producing
less  and  less  coal...... 
and yet in  7988  soild fuels
still accounted for about  28%
of total energy production.
primarily from American sources. However
a decision by President Eisenhower, de-
signed to safeguard American oil supplies
diverted large quantities of oil to Western
Europe from the much closer, but politically
often highly unstable countries of the Middle
East. Europe, and Japan, too, despite the
distances involved, quickly availed
themselves of this supply source. Many
observers regard this as the reason why japan
and Western Europe in particular experi-
enced faster and more uniform economic
growth than the USA at the end of the 1960s.
THE ROAD TO CRISIS
The first sign of change appeared towards the
end of 1969. Because world energy demand
was rising steadily and usually faster than the
oil companies' prognoses, and because the
role of oil as an energy source was becoming
more important, the oil-producing countries
gradually gained the upper hand and were
quick to realize the potential of this
favourable new situation. By coordinating
their policies they endeavoured to increase
and stabilize thei r oil revenue as far as possi-
ble, as the situation on the international ex-
change markets was characterized by uncer-
tainty owing to the floating of the dollar, the
currency in which most oil transactions
were, and still are, effected. Oil revenue is
the most important, if.not the sole, source of
income for many oil-producing countries.
Other countries such as Algeria, Iran and, to
a certain extent, Iraq have been able to
develop their agriculture and non-oil-related
industry on the strength of their
demographic and geographical resources.
For them, the revenue from oil exports was a
welcome means of diversifying their
economies, and the western industrialized
countries benefited enormously from their
purchases of capital goods and basic in-
frastructure. Other oil-producing countries
especially in Arabia
, .
did not have this
possibility. Consequently, they invested the
balance of their income (usually the larger
portion) after current expenditure and exten-
sive investment in their own infrastructure (illOil  prices
1965 1970
abroad ('petrodollars ). These usually short-
term investments constituted a large supply
offloating capital that, if notthe di rect cause
certainly contributed to some dangerous
currency fluctuations. Whatever the specific
differences between the individual coun-
tries, they all had a common interest in pro-
tecting their income against inflation and
loss of purchasing power. These objectives
were the driving force behind the oil-produc-
ing countries' policy from 1970. They were
reflected in the Teheran and Tripoli
Agreements (1971) on higher oil prices and in
some agreements in the following year
designed toadjustthese prices in the wake of
wild currency fluctuations.
Many elements of the scenario for the first oil
crisis were therefore already present owing
to the increasingly confident assertion by the
oil-producing countries of their own in-
terests. The trigger, but probably no more
1975 1980 1985 1990
than that, was the outbreak of the Yom Kip-
pur War in October 1973. As on previous oc"
casions, the Arab countries felt there was
justification for using oil as a political
weapon, although with the decisive dif-
ference that this time they did not stop at
threats. In December 1973 the oil-producing
countries refused to fix their prices in agree-
ment with the oil companies and announced
that they would in future decide prices
unilaterally. Crude oil prices were im-
mediately tripled and increased again .soon
after, with the result that ex-producer prices
at the beginning of 1974 were more than four
times their 1973 level.
This abrupt increase in prices had serious
repercussions for the economies of the
western industrialized countries. (The con-
sequences were far more serious for develop-
ing countries with little or no oil reserves,
many of whose financial problems assumedgigantic proportions as a result of the
quadrupling of their oil bill.) We shall return
in the following chapter to the far-reaching
consequences of the oil crisis, some of which
are still in evidence today. For the present, it
is sufficient to note that oil consumption
world-wide diminished substantially in the
years after 1973. The effect of this very
marked trend, coupled with efforts to make
more rational and sparing use of energy, was
that the Community was able to cater for de-
mand without serious problerns up to and in-
cluding 1978. The actual oil bill was lower
than feared, as widespread inflation and the
decline in the value of the dollar had a
moderati ng effect.
The crisis prompted President Nixon to call
an international energy conference in
February 1974, in which, in .addition to the
host country the USA, the European Com-
munity, all its Member States, Canada, Japan
and Norway took part. The conference ap-
pointed a coordinating group, whose work
led to an international energy agreement and
the founding of the International Energy
Agency (lEA).
The lEA, which established its headquarters
in Paris, has devoted itself to the following
rnain tasks:
(i) formulation and implementation of a pro-
gramme of long-term cooperation in the
development of energy sources and in
energy conservation
(ii) review of national energy-saving pro~
grarnmes and development of new energy
sources,
(iii) improved information on the oil and
natural gas markets
(iv) establishment of a centre for energy
statistics, and
(v) creation of a mechanism for restricting oil
demand and sharing available supplies in
times of crisis.
Following several years of relative calm, new
tensions appeared on the world market in
1979. Duringthefirst halfofthatyear, the Iran
crisis was reflected in a modest supply
deficit. However, as huge contingency sup-
plies were stockpiled in the light of ex-
perience with the first oil crisis, supply con-
tinued to contract resulting in higher prices
on the spot markets (particularly on the Com-
munity's crucial Rotterdam market). OPEC
took advantage of this situation to increase
official oil prices still further, causing them to
double in successive stages in 1980 as a
whole compared with the December 1978
level.
Thus the price per barrel of crude oil had
risen from under USD 3 to USD 36 as a result
of the two oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80.
This was the time when OPEC was at the
zenith of its influence and power. There were
some signs that the organization was about
to go too far. Furthermore, the heavy energy
users among the industrialized countries ad-
justed their behaviour considerably. Several
elements therefore coincided:
(i) the industrialized countries went into the
first world-wide recession since the Second
World War, which lasted until the early
1980s. The customary growth rates gave way
to zero growth and, in some cases, decline
(Community gross domestic product in 1975
diminished by 1% in real terms);
(i i) th is depressed energy demand, so that the
oil-producing countries were unable to
maintain the 1980 price level. Tensions sur-
faced in OPEC, leadingto major problems in
the hitherto solid group. Saudi Arabia in par-
ticular abandoned the policy of high prices.
Oil prices gradually fell, in part because in-
creased production in the North Sea
weakened OPEC's position and some oi I de-
mand was absorbed by greater use of nuclear
power and natural gas;
(iii) persistent international monetary in-
stability, particularly in the form of erratic
fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate, did
not only damage the finances of the in~
dustrialized countries. The oil-producing
countries' revenue also deteriorated because
of this development, which ironically
stemmed in no small measure from their
earlier, usually short-term, petrodollar in-
vestments. Finally, one of the chief causes ofthe international debt problem can also be
sought in the two oil crises.
EUROPE AND THE WORLD
ENERGY MARKET FROM THE
FIRST CRISIS TO THE PRESENT
IBJ
It is clear from this summary that the direct
cause of the aftermath ofthefirstoil crisis was
Europe de facto  tolerance of excessive
dependence on oil imports from politically
unstable parts of the world such as the Mid-
dle East. The lessons drawn from this interna-
tionally were that dependence on such im-
ports and thus economic vulnerability had to
be reduced at all costs. At the world
economic summitin Tokyo in 1979, the USA
Canada, Japan and the European Commun-
ity agreed to pursue a common strategy to
reduce oil consumption and hold imports in
the subsequent five years at their 1978 and
1979 levels, to promote energy saving and
the production and consumption of coal and
to coordinate development of alternative
energy sources. The target with regard to
reducing oil consumption was actually sur-
passed under the influence of the second oil
crisis. Energy consumption was reined in
and imports quickly dropped below the
levels envisaged in Tokyo.
In the years immediately after the second oil
crisis, the strategy of reducing dependence
on oil as far as possible had considerable suc-
cess. For example, Community gross primary
energy consumption remained more or less
constant between 1973 and 1985: it rose
from 1029 million toe to 1053 million toe in
1980, declining slightly again to 1 048
million toe in 1985. In 1973 the present 12
members of the Community together con-
sumed 606 million tonnes of oiL This had
fallen to 552 million tonnes in 1980 and 457
million tonnes in 1985, a figure which was,
however, distorted by the miners' strike in the
, i.e. it was artificially high. Oil produc-
tion within the 12 Community countries in-
creased from 13 milliontonnes to 93 million
tonnes in 1980 and 151 million tonnes in
1985 (mainly due to North Sea oil); net oil
imports fell from 643 million tonnes to 497
and 334 million tonnes respectively. A fact
worth noting is that the share of oil in total
energy demand and dependence on im"
ported energy declined by practically the
same amount: from 63% (65%) to 55%
(56%) and  46"10  (43%) respectively. Notable
in this context is that 1985 was a year in
which the recovery of the world economy
began to stabilize. As the lessons drawn from
the two oil crises had obviously been taken
on board (i.e. energy was being consumed
more rationally, new and less energy-inten-
sive technologies were being applied and
thermal insulation was being improved), it
appeared that the iron rule that economic
growth always implied increased energy
consumption no longer applied. The best in-
dicator of this relationship is probably
energy intensity, i.e. the quantity of energy
required to obtain a given volume of gross
domestic product. For every unit of GDP
(USD 1 million at 1980 prices) the world con-
sumed 616 toe in 1950, and still required 597
toe in 1976, while by 1986 this had fallen to
551 toe.
In 1986 OPEC had also drawn lessons from
its experience since 1973 and returned to the
system of fixed prices, the level of which
steadied at about USD 18/barrel, or approx-
imately half the level of 19.80 prices. At the
same time they agreed on a general ceiling
on production and individual production
quotas per country. OPEC representatives ex"
plicitly conceded at an internal Commission
seminaron energy policy in 1987 that the net
effect of the price fluctuations had been
negative both for the oil market and the inter-
national economy.
The picture, however, is still not complete.
On presentation of its review of Member
States' energy policies in the light of the
Community's energy objectives for 1995, the
Commission noted in February 1985 that the
Community was continuingto restructure its
energy supply to reduce oil dependence.
Nuclear energy was seen as the chief alter-
native. The share of oil in gross energy con-
sumption declined from 51 to 47% between
1982 and 1986. Solid fuels (particularly coal)
dropped slightly from 24 to 22%. Natural gasincreased its share slightly from 16 to 17%
while the share of nuclear power grew from
7 to 12%.
However, the Commission also noted with
some concern that the decoupling of energy
demand from economic growth (Le.
diminishing energy intensity) had slowed
down, at least as far as the period 1982-
was concerned. The annual growth in
energy demand of 2% per annum on average
was almost as high as the mean growth rate
in GDP at 2.2%. In some countries such as
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland
and Portugal, the de-linking trend had - ac-
cording to the Commission  actually been
reversed. Demand for electricity also ex-
ceeded economic growth with an increase of
3.3% per annum between 1982 and 1986.
The Commission is therefore probably right
in concluding that the inclination to con-
serve energy has diminished in the light of
lower energy prices (in particular of crude
oil) recently. Has Europe forgotten the
lessons of the two oil crises? Or is it in the
process of doing so? Let us return again to
1973 and the aftermath.EUROPE AfTER THE Oil CRISES
TH E POSITION
WHEN THE CRISES STRUCK
The  two  crises which caused oil prices to in-
crease twelvefold within a few years had
disastrous effects on the economies of
Europe and the whole world. The scars are
still visible today. The crisis in the steel in-
dustry with stagnating sales following the
build-up of overcapacities, which hit Europe
particularly hard from the middle of the
1970s, was a direct consequence of the sud-
den drop in demand for steel.
Although prices increased by approximately
the same amount both times, their effects
could scarcely be compared. The first crisis
in 1973 came at a time when utilization of
production capacities was running at a fairly
high level. In addition, raw material prices
outside the energy sector were on the upturn
which, together with a more expensive
dollar, intensified the inflationary effects of
the oil crisis. Inflation rates in the Commun-
ity, which during the 1960s had been run-
ning at just over 4%, rocketed to an average
of 12% in the years 1973- , although this
figure masks considerable differences from
country to country. Inflation rates of 15-20%
were recorded in Ireland, Italy and Greece
by no coincidence countries with a par-
ticularly high dependence on imported
energy. At the same time, the balance of
payments in most industrialized countries
was transformed into a deficit. Indebtedness
grew, which in turn led to disruptions in the
international monetary system and a further
shrinking of world trade. The Community'
gross domestic product declined in real
terms by over 1% in 1975. In short, the world
was in its first real recession since the Second
World War.
The second oil crisis broke before the conse-
quences of the changed energy situation had
been completely assimilated and adjustment
processes were still in train. Growth rates
were positive again, but nothing like as high
as in the early 1970s. The average growth rate
in the Community between 1976 and 1979
was 3.5%, compared with an average 5% in
the years 1969-70.
The economic situation, however, was tot-
ally different. Capacity utilization was run-
ningatamuchlowerrate, prices of many raw
materials were stagnating or declining, and
the leading industrialized countries were
coordinating economic policy more effec-
tively. As a result, a second recession in the
years 1979-80 was successfully avoided.
Nevertheless, the crisis persisted for several
years. Growth rates in the 24 member coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
averaged less than 1% during the years
1980- , with just over 0.8% in the European
Community, zero in the USA and about 3%
in Japan. It was not until 1983 that a period
of recovery set in, in the course of which
growth rates regained the levels of the late
1960s.
The employment situation, by contrast
showed little improvement and in some
cases even deteriorated. Unemployment in
the Community, which affected 3.5 million
people in 1974, had risen to 5 million by 1975
and hit the 10 million mark in 1981. The ac-
cession to the Community of Greece in 1981
and Spain and Portugal in 1986 brought with
it a substantial increase in unemployment
not only in absolute terms but also as a
percentage of the working population. There
were still no fewer than 15.5 million people
out of work in the Community of the Twelve
at the end of 1988, equivalent to an
unemployment rate of 10%.THE COMMUNITY'
REACTION TO THE NEW
SITUATION ON THE ENERGY
MARKET
Higher prices and the resulting recession af-
fected energy consumption in a way that
belied all experience since the Second
World War. Primary energy consumption
had increased steadily from 1950 to reach
approximately 1 000 million toe in 1973, the
year of the fi rst oil crisis, when the trend was
abruptly stopped. In the subsequent years
consumption in million toe developed as
follows: a drop in 1974 to 941 Mtoe and in
1975 to 890 Mtoe was followed by a slow,
but uneven, expansion to 947 and 942 Mtoe
in 1976 and 1977 respectively, and it was not
until 1978 that consumption regained its
1973 level. It peaked briefly at 1 012 Mtoe in
1979 but crashed again to its 1973 level in
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1980 at 970 Mtoe owing to the second oil
crisis and even further in 1981 to 934 Mtoe.
Gross primary energy consumption only
passed the thousand million mark again in
1985 (1 056 Mtoe) and 1986 (1 073 Mtoe).
These figures broadly reflect the ups and
downs of economic development during
those years. Industrial activity had declined
by 8% between 1974 and 1975 and recovered
only slowly thereafter. It was mainly physical
factors that were responsible for this in the
first phase, such as the interruption of sup-
plies to some countries and, of course, the
price development itself which obliged con"
sumers to hold back. At the same time, the
countries affected took measures to damp
energy consumption. What specific action
did the Community take?
Although the 1973 oil price increase did not
appear like a bolt from the blue as the warn-
ing signs had been there, the crisis hit the
1975 1980 1990 1985Community and most other heavy con-
sumers unprepared. The oil crisis was the
overriding issue at the Copenhagen Summit
on 14 and 15 December 1973, at which
representatives of the OPEC countries were
highly prominent, albeit unofficial, guests. In
view of the gravity of the situation, it was
agreed that energy policy measures should
be drawn up without delay, for which a new
body, the Energy Committee, was to be
responsible. It was to consist of represent-
atives of the Member States chaired by a
Commission Member; its brief was to secure
the coordinated implementation of the Com-
munity measures, facilitate exchange of in-
formation and consultations between
Member States and the Commission and
support the Commission in formulating its
proposals. However, under the pressure of
events, Member States initially began to
decide and implement their own measures
without proper coordination.
The first essential fora coordinated approach
was to get the facts. Designing a common
energy policy requires precise information
on the development of the energy market
and in particular the crude oil market. The
Commission did receive information on coal
and nuclear energy on the basis of the ECSC
and Euratom Treaties, but it was only in 1972
that the Council enacted provisions giving
the Commission access to information on
planned investments in the oil, natural gas
and electricity sectors, important data for the
assessment of future demand and con-
sumption.
Refinery in Antwerp. Even after two oil crises (so far), oil is still the Community's main primary energy
source, covering about  45%  of demand in  1988.After the onset of the energy crisis, the Com-
mission called on the Member States to pro-
vide quarterly information on the develop-
ment of oil and gas imports with a
breakdown by company to enable the Com-
munity to make a reliable assessment of the
supply situation. Two Council regulations
adopted in 1974 also required Member States
to notify the Commission of imports of oil
products and exports of hydrocarbons (oil,
derived products and gas). From 1979 on-
wards, in the light of the second oil crisis, oil
imports were subjected to even closer
monitoring in the form of a registration
obligation. In this way the Community
received some indication of the terms apply-
ing to these transactions. Finally, the
Member States decided in 1977 to collect
and forward to the Commission data on coal
imports from non-Community countries.
Of course the Commission did not just col-
lect all this information for its own sake. Its
purpose was to serve as a basis for concerted
action by the Member States in order to
secure the implementation of common
political guidelines and objectives. Such
concerted action has not been confined to
the national authorities: the Commission
also has regular contacts with market
operators, i.e. the oil companies, the major
transport and distribution undertakings and
the coal and electricity producers. Con-
sumers, too, are involved either individually
or through their representative organi-
zations.
THE  TOOLS AT  THE
COMMUNITY' S DISPOSAL
AND  THEIR  POTENTIAL
Armed with this information, the Commis-
sion was better equipped to create the foun-
dations of a common energy pol icy. Member
States only gradually came to accept that a
common policy offered greater prospects of
success in such a crucial area as energy sup-
plies, particularly in times of crises, than if
every State acted unilaterally. This insight did
not gain the same currency everywhere:
France, for example, fairly soon left the coor-
dinating group set up by the Washington
Energy Conference which led to the foun-
ding of the International Energy Agency,
because it had reservations about some
pol icy aspects. Nevertheless, the elements of
common energy policy gradually
crystallized and still form the backbone of
this policy today. They include:
(i) the setting of common medium-term
energy objectives, to the achievement of
which every Member State is to contribute
according to its ability. The first objectives
were formulated in 1974. In 1980 they were
more precisely defined for the period until
1990. In the spring of 1988 the Commission
presented the objectives for 1995, which will
be considered later. The Commission
monitors progress towards these objectives
and reviews Member States' energy policies
at regular intervals;
(ii) the use of certai n Community instruments
designed to supplement action by Member
States whenever this is likely to prove more
effective. These include joint research
development and demonstration program-
mes, Community legislation in areas such as
rational use of energy, harmonization of the
key components of price formation and coor-
dination of relations with certain non-Com-
munity partners. In addition, support for in-
vestment in equipment and modernization
in the energy sector is provided from the
Community budget and through loans from
Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC), the New Community Instru-
ment (NO) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB). Examples of such assistance in-
clude participation in the financing of power
stations, capital equipment for coal mines
and coal terminals, conversion of oil-fired
plant to solid fuels, expansion and integrated
operation .of electricity networks, develop-
ment of new energy sources and support for
various energy-saving projects in industry,
public buildings or in the operation of
district heating networks.
On the whole, the approach by the Com-
munity and the individual Member StatesCOMMUNITY FOSSIL FUEL USE FOR COMBUSTION PURPOSES
Mtoe 1980 1987 1995 2000 2010
Solid fuels 235 230 247 275 322
Oil 494 419 480 466 428
Gas 184 207 236 250 276
Total 913 856 963 991 1 026
Total primary
energy 1025 1 062 1 226 1 277 1 375
Community
fossil fuel
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combustion
as percentage
of TPER
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has been successful. The Community was
able to reduce its oil imports by 50% be-
tween 1973 and 1983. It has also been
calculated that more rational use of energy
saves the Community the equivalent of 250
million tonnes of oil. At the same time, North
Sea oil reserves contributed around 130
million tonnes; an equivalent volume of im-
ports was saved through greater use of
nuclear energy and natural gas.
Let us now examine this success more
closely. If, instead of absolute consumption
figures, we take energy intensity as a yard-
stick  i.e. the ratio of final energy consump-
tion to gross domestic product - it emerges
that 10 of the current 12 Community coun-
tries, including Spain which launched
energy-saving programmes in the 1970s
have been able to improve this ratio by 20%
(Community average). In particular Luxem-
bourg (38.8%), Belgium (29.5%), Denmark
(27.9%) and Ireland (27.6%) achieved ex-
cellent results in the period 1973-82. Greece
by contrast, which had no such programme
at that time, paid for its growth with a
deterioration of 1.9% in energy intensity.
To recapitulate: 1973 to 1982 was the period
in which the world suffered two oil crises.
However, as the unpleasant memories began
to fade, the will to continue along the path
embarked upon slackened. Progress in
reducing energy intensity rapidly diminish.
ed: the impressive figure of 20% on average
for the Community in the years 1973-
shrunk by a factor of 10 to 2.4% in the four
years from 1982 to 1986. The background at
the time was one in which the industrial
restructuring made necessary by the oil
crises had largely been completed and crude
oil prices stagnated and then began to slide.
The picture is even more worrying when the
Member States are considered separately.
Four countries, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland
not only failed to make any progress during
this period, but energy intensity actually
deteriorated, i.e. they had to use more energy
to achieve the same groWth rate. While in the
case of Germany the dimension involved was
comparatively small (-0.3%), in Ireland'
case, for example, it was considerably
greater (-13%). As the Commission noted the spring of 1988 ' Most Member States have
reviewed their energy efficiency policies in
the light of the changed energy market con-
ditions and the experience gained with
various initiatives. The result of this reap-
praisal has been the reduction (if not the total
elimination) of direct subsidy programmes
for energy efficiency investments . Only Italy,
the Netherlands and Denmark maintained
their R&D spending at the same level during
this period. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, for example, reduced its allocation for
energy efficiency R&D by a factor of more
than three compared with the figure ofECU
110 million in 1981.
These alarming developments were situated
in a context of fundamental change. The four
years from 1982 to 1986 were characterized
by the following main trends on the energy
markets:
(i) gross energy consumption in 1986 for the
Community as awhole was about 8% higher
than in 1982 and some 4% higher than in
1973;
(ii) the share of oil in gross energy consump-
tion decreased from 63% in 1973 to 51% in
1982 and 47% in 1986;
(iii) the share of net oil imports in gross
energy consumption fell from 62% in 1973 to
38% in 1982 and 33% in 1986;
(iv) the share of natural gas in gross .energy
consumption grew from 11% in 1973 to 16%
in 1982, and then remained more or less
stable (1986: 17%);
(v) the share of solid fuels in the Communi-
ty's energy balance was 23% in 1973 24% in
1982 and 23% in 1986, i.e. relatively stable;
(vi) the share of hydrocarbons in electricity
generation decreased from about 42% in
1973 to 24% in 1982 and 16% in 1986;
(vii) the share of solid fuels in electricity
generation increased from 45% in 1973 to
48% in 1982, but fell back to 42% in 1986;
(viii) the share of nuclear power in electricity
generation, however, increased steadily
from 8% in 1973 to 21% in 1982 and 37% in
1986.
These are significant changes, both with
regard to the relative position of the in-
dividual energy sources and, partly as a con-
sequence of this, the Community'
dependence on imports (and hence
vulnerability). How are events expected to
develop until 1995? Are the 1982-
developments in line with the prognoses?
What is the importance of the internal
market scheduled for 1992? These are some
of the questions we shall consider in the next
two chapters.COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES
ENERGY OBJECTIVES
FOR 1995
In spring 1985 the Commission presented its
1995 energy objectives. The following
targets were set in the individual sectors:
(i) the efficiency  of  final energy demand
should be improved by at least 20%;
(ii) oil consumption should be reduced to
around 40%  of  energy consumption and net
oil imports thus maintained at less than one-
third  of  total energy consumption in the
Community;
(iii) the share of natural gas in the energy
balance should be maintained in order to en"
sure secure and diversified supplies;
(iv) the share  of  solid fuels in energy con-
sumption should be increased;
(v) efforts to promote consumption of solid
fuels and to improve the competitiveness 
solid fuel production .capacities in the Com-
munity should be continued;
(vi) the share of electricity generated from oil
and gas should be reduced to under 15% in
1995;
(vii) the output from new and renewable
energy sources should be substantially in-
creased to enable them to make a significant
contribution to the total energy balance.
The first review undertaken by the Commis-
sion in spring 1988 on the basis of informa-
tion from the Member States indicated that
these objectives would probably be only
partly achieved. The main results  of  the in-
terim review were:
(i) the efficiency  of  final energy demand was
unlikely to improve by the figure  of  at least
20% specified for 1995;
(ii) the share  of  oil in gross energy consump-
tion was I ikely to drop to around 43 %; Com-
In terms Qf air pollution nuclear energy can be regarded  as a clean technology...munity net oil imports would represent
about one-third oftotal energy consumption;
(iii) the share of natural gas in the energy
balance would probably be more or less
maintained;
(iv) the share of solid fuels in gross energy
consumption was likely to increase slightly;
(v) the share of oil and gas in electricity
generation was likely to drop below 15%;
the share of solid fuels and nuclear energy
was likely to be 44% and 38% respectively;
(vi) renewables would probably represent
about 2% of the Community's total energy
balance.
The Commission viewed these national pro-
jections with some degree of scepticism. It
considered the estimates of future consump-
tion of solid fuels to be too high and in fact
did not exclude a drop in their market share.
It believed that a 'comfortable degree of cer-
tainty' only existed with regard to the share
of oil and gas in electricity generation and
the market share of natural gas. As far as
nuclear energy is concerned, the after-effects
of the Chernobyl accident were still in
evidence at the time of the review (there is
still disquiet in some countries, particularly
when, as in the Federal RepublicofGermany,
the public gets to know of potentially serious
incidents belatedly and seemingly purely by
chance).
The most alarming finding in the Commis-
sion s view is that efforts to improve energy
efficiency might not have the desired suc-
cess. In this event, it estimates that energy
consumption in 1995 may be between 70
and 110 million toe higher than the target.
This would not only add between ECU 8 and
13 thousand million to the energy bill at cur-
rent oil prices, but 'would be a serious set-
back making the Community much more
vulnerable to supply shortages or price rises
or  both... A setback in this area of energy effi-
... 
but the subsequent costs, especially  as  regards the environment, are considerable. For example
radioactive waste has to be 'disposed  of'  (plant in Tihange).ciency would also worsen the Community'
international economic competitiveness
jeopardize security of supply by increasing
energy import needs and hinder en-
vironmental progress
The pursuit of energy efficiency was pro-
bably also the main motive for the Thermie
programme presented by the Commission at
the beginning of March 1989. It was design-
ed to provide financial support and
disseminate technological know-how in the
following sectors:
(i) energy efficiency,
(ii) renewable energy sources
(iii) clean coal technologies
(iv) oil and gas prospecting and develop-
ment.
The Commission therefore sounded an
urgent warning in its review of Member
States' energy policies, for the Community
can not afford to tolerate any weaken i ng of its
international competitiveness, particularly at
a time when it is poised to reap the promised
dividends of the internal market with the
elimination of all barriers to the free mov~
ment of persons, goods, services and capital
and, by this token improved com-
petitiveness on world markets. When we
considerthatthe internal energy market con-
stitutes an important part of the internal
market as a whole, the ci rcle is complete. Let
us therefore turn our attention to the internal
energy market, which is one of the Commis-
sion s priority objectives.
THE INTERNAL ENERGY
MARKET
We have alreadyseen that energy is a special
case and that an internal energy market will
differ in some respects from the internal
market in other sectors. The drive for greater
competition reaches its limits where it in"
terferes with the security of supply. A con-
tinuous, fine-meshed energy supply 
reasonable prices is crucial to the smooth
operation of the internal market in all other
sectors and in order to secure and promote
competition. The Commission is therefore
convinced that the public sector can con-
tinue to have a role in the internal energy
market. Having said that, the internal energy
market is a sector like any other and barriers
must be removed. Indeed, the barriers in this
sector may even be more deeply entrenched
and more vigorously defended by those they
have hitherto protected than in other areas.
The firmness of purpose required is therefore
all the greater.
Areas of action: ' Horizontal' barriers
The White Paper on completing the internal
market adopted by the European Council in
Milan at the end of June 1985 and the work-
ing paper on the internal energy market
(COM(88) 238) set out the course to be
followed. Specifically, the following areas
are involved:
(i) the application of Community law; this
very general concept concerns action
against Treaty infringements in relation to
trade barriers, competition and subsidies;
(ii) the removal of technical barriers through
harmonization of statutory provisions and
standards;
(iii) the opening up  of  public procurement
including the Commission s plans to extend
this principle to the energy sector;
(iv) the removal offiscal barriers, in particular
the approximation of indirect taxation.
Removal  of  technical barriers
These barriers concern legally binding na-
tional regulations and standards of a gener-
ally voluntary character, both of which differ
from one country to another. They affect not
only the manufacture of equipment used by
energy producers, but also the appliances
used by the final consumers. Since the begin-
ning of May 1985, the Council of Ministers
has applied the 'new approach', which con-
sists in defining only the essential health and
safety requirements of machinery and equip-
ment. The translation of these requirements
into technical specifications is then a matter
for the standardization committees of Euro"
pean industry, CEN and Cenelec. Herein liesoneofthekeys to opening up public procure-
ment markets.
In the case of hydrocarbons, for example, im-
pediments arise from differences in formula-
tions of petroleum products introduced by
the refiningindustry to comply with differing
requirements on national markets. Only a
few criteria have been harmonized so far in
Community legislation. For example, a stan-
dard (EN-28) for unleaded petrol defines a
number of common characteristics for
petrol, but leaves other specifications to
Member States' discretion.
Opening up of public procurement
It is not only in the energy sector that the
Community is entering uncharted territory.
As the Commission noted: 'This is therefore
an extremely vast area which is little known
and where intervention by the public
authorities, such as it is, is rarely official. It
may, nevertheless, be very effective and, in a
Community which is still in the making, na-
tional chauvinism is often a natural reaction.
The Commission should examine whether
these practices constitute an obstacle to a
reduction in energy prices/costs, the first and
foremost objective of the internal energy
market, and whether they are compatible
with the Treaty rules . These 'behavioural
anomalies' undoubtedly exist in the case of
all energy equipment and all Member States.
Approximation of indirect taxation
The differences in the way in which energy
is taxed in the Member States are widely con-
sidered to be a major, if not the biggest,
obstacle on the road to an internal energy
market, just as the approximation of the
various systems of indirect taxation is
generally considered to be the most difficult
aspect of the whole internal market pro-
gramme. The issue in the energy sector is
above all VAT and the approximation of ex-
cise duties on petroleum products, par-
ticularly petrol and diesel. There are enor-
mous differences between the Member
States in this respect: the cumulative burden
of VAT and excise duty on premium petrol
ranged from ECU 2S0 to ECU 650/m
3 at the
end of 1987. The Community average was
ECU 400/m , with the result that the devia-
tion ofthe two extremeS from this mean was
-40% and +60% respectively. At the same
time, the excise duty on heavy fuel oil varied
from zero to nearly ECU SO/tonne. It is clear
that such differences are bound to have an
impact on competitiveness in the countries
concerned.
Free movement of goods and services
Articles 30 to 36 on the free movement of
goods are among the key provisions of the
Treaty and are also by the same token a cor-
nerstone of the internal market programme.
These provisions also apply to energy except
for coal, for which, however, Article 4a ofthe
ECSC Treaty lays down the same principles.
As the Commission noted in its 1988 paper
on the internal energy market, the two provi-
sions 'prohibit any measures by the Member
States which either directly or indirectly, ac-
tually or potentially constitute a barrier to in-
tra-Community trade. They lay down the
principle that every product which is legally
manufactured and commercialized in one
Member State may circulate freely within the
Community'. This principle was endorsed by
the landmark 'Cassis de Dijon' judgment of
the European Court in 1979, and it has been
successfully used to dismantle some for-
midable historical trade barriers such as the
national purity requirements for beer
spaghetti and sausage. Derogations from this
principle are permitted only if justified on
grounds of public security, protection of
health and life of humans, animals or plants
in accordance with Article 36 of the EEC
Treaty.
Member States have, however, adopted a
large variety of national measures on the
basis of the provisions for exemptions,
although it is by no means always certain that
they can be justified pursuant to Article 36.
They include, for example, importlicencere-
quirements, the requirementtopresent a cer-
tificate of origin, rules requiring bilateral
reciprocity of imports and exports, provi-
sionslaying down different requirements for
imports and exports, restrictions or re-quirements regarding the storage of goods
restrictions on the useof national utilities, ex-
hortations to buy national products, price
controls and, last but not least, provisions
specifying certain technical requirements of
a product.
Such measures, to the extentthatthey cannot
be justified, constitute an infringement ofthe
Treaty. However, even where they are
justified, there are limits to Member States
freedom to adopt measures on these
grounds: they must respect the principle of
proportionality, they have to be in pursuit of
legitimate aim and they have to be
necessary to the attainment of this aim. If
there are alternative measures which impose
less damaging restrictions on the exchange
of goods and services between Member
States, then only these measures will be ac-
ceptable in Community law.
State monopolies
In view of the special quality of energy, in
particular the need to guarantee security of
supply, national monopolies are a common
phenomenon in this sector. The oil market is
characterized by import and distribution
monopolies for products from non-Com-
munity countries. The Accession Treaties
with Spain and Portugal specifically direct
them gradually to open up such structures. In
addition, Member States have retained and
delegated to public or private enterprises ex-
clusive rights to import and export other
energy products. This is particularly the case
in the gas and electricity sectors. Another
practice is for States or regional authorities to
give public or private enterprises exclusive
rights of transport and distribution. It will
therefore have to be exam i ned whether such
exclusive rights hinder or even prevent trade
between Member States. In particular, it will
have to be examined whether this situation is
compatible with Articles 30 and 37 on the
phasing out of monopolies of a commercial
character. In the gas and electricity sectors in
particular, the problem can be reduced to
two issues, the resolution of which is likely to
be crucial to the whole question of an inter-
nal energy market.
(i) How can the requirements of free trade in
electricity and gas in the Community be
reconciled with the need for a high level of
quality and security ofsupply?
(ii) Under which conditions might large in"
dustrial customers of local and regional
energy distributers be granted direct access
to a given resource?
Common to both reflections is that they offer
third parties the possibility of access to ex-
istingtransport networks, so that one or more
undertakings would pay for use of the trans-
port infrastructure.
Ruks of rompeuuoo and Stare am
Compliance with the Treaty rules of competi-
tion and the provisions on State aid (and
Commission monitoring of this compliance)
is essential to the creation and consolidation
of the internal energy market. Any trade bar-
riers resulting from the conduct of one or
several undertakings are covered by the com-
petition rules of the EEC Treaty. In view of
their importance, the main provisions are set
out on the page .opposite.
It is worth emphasizing in this connection
that public undertakings and undertakings
which the national authorities have granted
special or exclusive rights are also in princi-
ple subject to the competition rules of the
Treaty.
An issue with a direct bearing on competi-
tion is State aid, for the granting of State aid
almost always involves distortion, or at least
impairment, of competition. However, levels
of aid to the different energy production sec-
tors vary considerably. The coal industry is
the most prominent recipient of support,
although the ECSC Treaty originally expli-
citly prohibited subsidies in order to prevent
unfair competition on the Community coal
market. However, unlike steel, the other
pillar' of the Coal and Steel Community,
coal did notfall victim to displacement com-
petition, for the markets for coal have largely
been national markets, intra-Community
trade in coal being relatively insignificant.
The purpose of the national aid granted sub-
ject to special Community permission wasArticle 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementaryobligations which, by their nature of according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be
automatically void.
Article 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com-
mon market in sO far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalenttransactions with other trading parties
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Article 90
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force
any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules
provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subjectto the rules
contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the ap-
plication of such rules does not obstructthe performance, in law or in fact, of the par-
ticular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this article and
shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.
not to protect German coal from French
competition or vice versa, but rat~er to pre-
vent the total demise of domestic coal pro-
duction. An example of such State aid is the
German hard coal levy, which is a source of
irritation to the other Member States, in par-ticular France. For even though the coal levy,
which is intended to make domestic coal a
viable proposition for electricity generators,
is financed by the final consumer through
electricity prices and not by the  State,  there
is no denying that it is equivalent to a subsidy
to the coal producers. Whatever the merits of
the case, the existing provisions on national
coal aid expire at the end of 1993 when the
whole issue will have to be renegotiated in
the light of the internal market. We shall
return to this aspect later.
However, aid is also granted in other energy
sectors. It may not be so visible, but it is no
less effective for that. It includes investment
aid for power station construction and
allocations to research and development or
to nuclear energy with an effectequivalentto
aid. The use of energy pricing practically as
a form of aid to final consumers, in particular
large industrial customers, also belongs in
this category. This, too, is a practice which
needs to be examined with a critical eye in
order to ascertain whether, in its present
form, it really is compatible with an internal
energy market.
Costs, prices, tariffs
That the Commun ityenergy market today is
characterized by major differences in costs
prices and tariffs requires no further explana-
tion. The differences would already be con-
siderable even without the differences in na-
tional taxation. In theory, the solution is sim-
ple: the principal driving forces of competi-
tion and trade should be 'realistic' costs
prices and tariffs, meaning that they are
determined under objective, transparent
conditions  in particular without in"
terference from the public authorities, more
often than not for reasons that have nothing
to do with energy. This highly complex sub-
ject and possible remedies are considered in
greater depth below. Commission surveys in
this area reveal a number of recurring
themes: differences in cost structures in the
individual Member States lack 
transparency in price formation, particularly
for major customers, and total inconsistency
between prices and tariff structures for the
various energy types, especially between gas
and electricity and with regard to price levels
in the Member States.
As expected, this sector proved to be a highly
sensitive one. The Member  States  have tradi-
tionally been reticent on the subject of
energy pricing, as their reaction to a Com-
mission paper of autumn 1984 entitled 'The
application of the Community's energy pric-
ing principles in Member States' demon-
strated. In June 1985 the Council
acknowledged that it was unable to reach
agreement on the conclusions of this paper.
However, the implications of the internal
market are such that matters cannot be left
there. If the compartmentalized markets of
the energy sector are to be opened up to
transnational competition, it is essential to
have comparative data on energy prices in
order to bring greater transparency to price
formation with due regard for confidentiality.
It will also be necessary to examine price
structures in the Member States in order to
ascertain whether differences in treatment
between industrial customers and private
households, between different sectors of in-
dustry and within a given sector are plausible
and compatible with the requirements of the
internal energy market. The transparency
and objectivity of the terms, cost structure
and pricing principles of energy supplies in
the Community will also be the subject of
scrutiny. The electricity industry is regarded
by the Commission as something of a test
case.
Differences in tariffs of industrial customers
are immediately obvious. In 1986 these
customers paid ECU Z19/1O0 kWh in Paris
but ECU 9.84 in Dusseldorf, and ECU 10.
in Milan compared with ECU 8.95 in Rot-
terdam.
This and other inconsistencies led the Com-
mission to launch an initiative for greater
transparency in price formation in spring
1989. A draft directive is designed to require
the supply undertakings to notify the Com-
mission of the prices and terms of gas and
electricity supplies to industrial customersG
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.and to provide information on existing price
systems and the breakdown of customers by
consumer category. The Commission will
treat these data confidentially to the extent
that they are subject to commercial secrecy.
!ill
Infrastructures
Generally speaking, the Community already
has efficient energy infrastructures. There are
dense transport networks for natural gas,
crude oil and oil products and more par-
ticularly for electricity. The integrated net-
works for public electricity supply extend
beyond Community borders:
(i) the UCPTE grid takes in Belgium, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece. Austria, Switzerland and
Yugoslavia are also connected. Denmark
too, is part of the grid and so, since 1985, is
the UK;
(ii) Nordel is the interlinked network of elec-
tricity supply companies in Denmark
Finland, Norway and Sweden;
(iii) The Ufipte grid is formed by the supply
companies of France, Spain and Portugal;
(iv) the Sudel grid links Italy, Yugoslavia
Greece and Austria.
Many Community countries are thus in-
tegrated in several grids. Ireland, by contrast
is not connected into any other system. One
of the Commission s priorities is therefore to
extend the integrated electricity network to
Ireland and to improve the linkage with
Greece. Expansion of the European long-
distance gas pipeline network is perhaps an
even more immediate priority. As yet, five
Member States - UK, Ireland, Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece - are not linked into this
system. Theconditions for a common natural
gas market will be met only when these
countries are also integrated.
The instruments dedicated to the achieve-
ment of greater economic and social cohe-
sion of the Community by the European
Council in February 1988 could also be used
to improve Community infrastructures. A
specific share to be determined of the struc-
tural Funds, which are to be doubled by
1993, could be allocated for this purpose, as
well as resources from the European Invest"
ment Bank and other financial instruments
specifically intended to impart fresh impetus
to the drive  for  cohesion. It would, for in-
stance, be worth clarifying how a regional
policy programme such as Valoren, designed
to improve the utilization of local energy
sources in less developed regions, can con-
tribute to this process. Another possibility
which would, however, first have to be sanc-
tioned by the Council, would involve the
Commission s proposals for infrastructure
projects of Community interest.
Three types of infrastructure should be con-
sidered here: reception infrastructure
storage infrastructure and transport and
distribution infrastructure. Specifically, this
could involve:
(i) the development of port reception in-
frastructure for coal (coal terminals as main
or transhipment ports) and natural gas (ter-
minals for deliveries of gas in the unaltered
state or as LNG);
(ii) where transport infrastructure is con-
cerned, the newly created legal form of the
European economic interest grouping
(EEIG)' which came into force in 1989 could
serve as an instrument of common operation
of existing networks, an increase in their
capacity or the development of new
networks;
(iii) with regard to storage, the creation of a
Community oil and/or natural gas storage
capacity is conceivable, which, by virtue of
its location and size, could reduce storage
costs and increase security of supply in the
event of supply difficulties.
Such infrastructure projects could cover all
energy sources, e.g. in the case of solid fuels
there is scope for long-distance pipelines to
transport water-coal mixtures or oil-coal
mixtures. Another possibility would be to ex-
pand the existing pipeline network for
petroleum products. However, the most in-
teresti ng prospects exist for electricity, where
the first task would be to extend the existing
grid interconnection to all Member States.This is the background to a proposal for a
directive presented by the Commission at the
end  of  September 1989 (COM(89) 336)
designed to increase the transit  of  electricity
through transmission grids in the Commun-
ity. The Commission advances the view that
greater integration  of  the electricity industry
and increased trade in electricity - which at
present accounts for only 4%  of  consump-
tion- could reduce the cost  of  supply to the
consumer, improve security  of  supply and
facilitate rapid, flexible reactions to sudden
supply bottlenecks. The estimated savings
speak for themselves. In the short term, i.
up to 1992, ECU 1 300 million annually
could be saved, in the medium term to the
year 2 000 the annual saving ranges between
ECU 2 300 and 5 300 million and the long"
term forecast for the year 2010 is for a saving
of  between ECU 6000 and 13 000 million.
The breadth  of  the range in the medium- and
long-term forecasts is explained by the dif-
ferentassumptions regarding construction 
new power stations and/or modernization.
The issue  of  third-party access  both for
large industrial customers and energy
distributors ~tothetransport network is cur-
rently being discussed in the context  of 
open internal market. The Netherlands and
the UK already have fairly definite plans in
this direction. The Commission is discussing
this novel idea with all interested parties,
namely the Member States and energy pro-
ducers, distributors, network operators and
consumers, including private consumers.
The Commission s proposal for a Council
regulation requiring Member States to notify
investments  of  Community interest in the
energy sector (COM(89) 335) is another in-
itiative with a similar purpose, i.e. optimum
use  of  energy production and supply
structures.
Obstacles and priority measures in the
individual energy sectors
Solid fuels
In 1988 solid fuels accounted for around
28%  of  Community energy production. A
total  of  185 million tonnes  of  coal equivalent
(tce) were produced in the Community as a
whole in this reference year. (Thetce is a unit
calculated in a similar way to the toe, namely
in terms  of  equivalent calorific value. One
tce is equivalent to 0.7 toe.) The UK ac"
counted for 46%  of  this production, the
Federal Republic  of  Germany 40%, while the
remainder was distributed between Spain
(7%), France (6%) and Belgium (1%). The
Federal Republic  of  Germany is by far the
largest producer  of  brown coal and peat
(66%); it is followed by Greece (19%), Spain
(8%) and Ireland (5%). For several years now,
or  at least since the beginning  of  the first oil
crisis, there has been a trend towards higher
imports of hard coal, which have shown a
higher proportional increase than consump-
tion. The most important Community sup-
pliers by volume are the USA, Australia
South Africa and Poland. Intra"Community
trade in coal amounted to approximately 8.
million tcein 1988. This mainly concerned
traditional supplies  of  coking coal and coke
from Germany and much smaller volumes 
steam coal from the UK.
Except in the United Kingdom, where major
restructuring took place in the first half  of  the
1980s, the financial situation  of  the coal in-
dustryhas deteriorated. The principal reason
for this is the fall in prices  of  imported coal
expressed in national currencies, which have
a considerable impact on prices  of  Com-
munity-produced coal.
All producers, whether private, public 
mixed companies, have been hit by the
decline in profits. This is despite the fact that
mining companies in the three main pro-
ducer countries at least (UK Federal
Republic  of  Germany and Spain) have
guaranteed long-term sales contracts with
large customers such as foundries and power
stations, in the case  of  which the mechanism
for fixing prices does not, in the words  of  the
Commission, 'necessarily correspond to
market realities . The content  of  these
agreements is as follows:
(i) in Germany, electricity producers have
undertaken in the 'Jahrhundertvertrag' toF
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,purchase 640 million tce of German coal ir-
respective of their requirements (until 1995)
and the economic situation (until 1991). A
charge is levied on electricity consumption
in the form of the 'Kohlepfennig . The pro-
ceeds from this are used to compensate the
electricity producers for the price difference
between Community coal purchased at cost
price and heavy fuel oil in respect of 22
million tce and for the price difference bet-
ween Community-produced and imported
coal in respect of  11  million tce;
(ii) in the UK, there are supply agreements
between British Coal and the Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board;
(iii) in Spain, Carbuni6n, the mining com-
panies' association , agreed on a system of
awarding contracts for coal supplies to
power stations with the electricity pro-
ducers' association (Unesa).
These agreements do not explicitly rule out
the use of coal from other Community coun-
tries. However, they do considerably restrict
competition from imported coal and other
energy sources. Between 1965 and 1986,
some ECU 50 000 mi II ion were spent on aid
schemes and other measures to support cur-
rent production and this figure has recently
increased significantly as a resultofthe fall in
world prices for coal and the value of the
dollar, Whereas in 1986 the average price for
imported coal was about USD 50ft, the
average cost price of Community-produced
coal was more than USD 100ft, i.e. more than
double.
It is clear in the light of such price differences
that the Community coal industry will con-
tinue to have difficulty in standing on its own
feet in future. Aid can still be paid until 1993
but the Commission makes authorization
subject to compliance with the following
aims:
(i) improvement of the competitiveness of the
coal industry, and thus greater security of
supply;
(ii) creation of new production capacities
provided that they are economically viable;
(iii) solution of the social and regional pro-
blems related to developments in the coal in-
dustry.
Oil and petroleum products
Despite two energy crises, oil is still the main
primary energy source in the Community,
and will remain so in the foreseeable future.
In 1988 oil accounted for approximately
45% of the Community s primary energy re-
quirements. Total oil consumption, in-
cluding supplies to shipping and air trans-
port, amounted to approximately 517million
tonnes. The Commission estimates that total
energy consumption is likely to increase and
with it oil consumption, although to a lesser
extent, as the share of oil in primary energy
consumption should fall slightly to between
42 and 45%. The share of oil products in
energy consumption varies greatly accor-
ding to sector of activity, ranging from 12% in
electricity generation to 97% in transport.
Unlike the other sectors, where substitute
energy sources are already extensively used
(nuclear power), in transport the consump-
tion of oil products has grown steadily, and
there are many signs that this trend will con-
tinue at least in the medium term.
By contrast to most other energy sectors, the
oil market can be regarded as one which is
already subject to extensive competition. A
number of factors have helped to bring this
about:
(i) integration of the Community crude oil
and petroleum products industry in the
global markets, where national undertakings
and independent distribution companies
operate alongside international concerns;
(ii) the ample supply of petroleum products
from Community refineries, which can
generally satisfy Community demand, and
from refineries in non-Community
countries;
(iii) the lack of a network structure, which
prevents distribution monopolies from aris-
ing: with oil, unlike natural gas and elec-
tricity, the consumer can choose between a
number of competing suppliers; lTI)CONSUMER PRICES FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
(NET OF DUTIES AND TAXES)
Situation at 14 September 1987
Residual
Price net Premium Regular Auto- Heating fuel oil
of tax: petrol petrol motive gas oil
high
gas oil sulphur
1000 I 1000 I 1000 I 1 000 I tonne
EEC
average
in ecu 1 187 164 188 156 107
(%)
Belgium 102 110 104
Denmark 115 132 114 115 108
FR of
Germany
Greece
Spain 104 110 102 104
France 114 101 114
Ireland 128 140 133 119 142
Italy 102 102
Luxembourg 114 124 101 113 101
Netherlands 106 100 104
Portugal 109 113 133
United
Kingdom 106 114 105 116 112
Source: Commission oil prices bulletin No 403.
The average is obtained by weighting the quantities consumed in each country in  1985.
lEI
(iv) the transparency of international prices
which are formed in response to supply and
demand on the Rotterdam and Genoa spot
markets.
However, that is only one side of the story.
There are still a great many obstacles to be
removed before there can be talk of a true in-
ternal market in oil and petroleum products.TAXATION OF NATURAL GAS
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) ON SALES OF
GAS (AS PERCENTAGE OF PRICE NET OF
VAT)
1987
Belgium
Denmark
FR of Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Italy (domestic)
Italy (non-domestic)
Netherlands
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
Ireland
Portugal
18.
181
20-
The tax applied generally h;  18 % except for ex-
tractive and manufacturing industries (in-
cluding printing and publishing) which benefit
from  reduced tax of  9%.
The  6%  tax applies only to sales of gas to the
horticultural sector.
As we have already seen, these include dif-
ferences in consumer prices before tax.
These already constitute considerable distor-
tions, which are aggravated when dif-
ferencesin taxation are taken into account.
In addition, the Commission considers that
the following obstacles in the oil sector
should be removed as a matter of priority:
(i) differences in the rules and technical stan-
dards applying to motor fuels and other
petroleum products;
(ii) differences in the quality standards for
petroleum products, the principal problem
being more stringent environmental stan-
dards in some Member States and thus the
question of whether the principle of mutual
recognition can be applied in this field;
(Hi) obstacles arising from the existence of oil
monopolies;
(iv) certain provisions concerning the
monopolies which are at present permitted
such as exclusive rights of refining and of
marketing national products, and the pro-
hibition of cross-frontier delivery;
(v) obstacles relating to internal transport in
Community countries.
Natural gas
The widespread use of natural gas in the
Community energy industry is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon, but its progress has been
almost meteoric. Natural gas really came in-
to its own in Europe with the discovery in
1959 of the giant Groningen field in the
Netherlands, followed by other significant
finds in the North Sea. In the 15 years from
1971 to 1986, its share of primary energy con-
sumption doubled from 9 to 18%. Large off-
shore fields were also discovered in Norway
and the UK. Norway and other traditional
suppliers such as the Soviet Union and
Algeria are now the chief source of the Com-
munity's gas imports, which currently stand
at around 35% of consumption and will pro-
bably reach 40% and more by the year 2000.
Natural gas is likely to remain a major con-
tributor to the Community's primary energy
balance because of the security of supply it
offers and, increasingly important, in view of
its environmental advantages.
The following obstacles to completion of the
internal market in natural gas must be
overcome.
(i) State of the European gas grid. The Com-
mission feels that the Community should
promote integration above all by connecting
the UK, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal
into the interconnected network.
(ii) Price transparency. This criterion is con-
sidered to be crucial to the completion of the
internal market and concerns off-tariff sales
of natural gas to industrial customers. Prac-
tices vary widely from one Member State to
another: sales to industrial consumers are
based on pre-set tariffs in France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Belgium, while individual
contracts for large consumers are concluded
in the UK and Germany. However, even in
countries with pre-set tariffs, individual large
consumers or groups of undertakings from
the same industry may obtain special rates.The Commission has forwarded to the Coun-
cil a proposal on greater transparency in off-
tariff sales which safeguards the confiden-
tiality of the individual contracts.
(iii) Differences in tax rates. Here, too, the
problems are primarily due to differences in
VAT rates. As in the case of oil, the solution
will have to be sought in an approximation of
the rates.
Electricity
Electricity is a vital part of the energy balance
of the Community, as in every other part of
the industrialized world. Most primary
energy, including nuclear energy, solid fuels
hydropower and other renewables, is used to
generate electricity which has made asignifi-
cant contribution to reducing dependence
on oi I. In 1988, 34% of all primary energy on
a Community average was used to generate
electricity, and up to 42% in France. Elec-
tricity's share of Community final energy
consumption is 18.1%.
In considering the internal market in elec-
tricity, it should be borne in mind that elec"
tricity is a very special form of energy. It is by
far the most common, and hence almost the
classic, form of secondary energy, and is
generated from the primary sources listed in
the preceding paragraph. It has two main
characteristics: it cannot be stored, and it is
essential to the running of a modern
economy.
These two featu res determ i ne the structu re of
the electricity sector. As electricity cannot be
stockpiled, supply and demand must be
matched at all times. However, supply struc-
tures must be efficient and flexible enough to
cope with sudden surges in demand. It is for
this reason that security of supply is as impor-
tant with regard to electricity as to other
energy sources. As we have already seen,
Member States have responded in different
ways to this requirement. The coexistence of
different generation, transport and distribu-
tionstructures, which have also developed
differently in the individual countries for
historical reasons, considerably complicate
efforts to complete the internal market in
electricity. The Commission considers joint
action in the following areas to be a matter of
priority.
(i) Statutory standards and requirements.
Technical requirements for the supply of
electricity to consumers must be harmon-
ized. National differences in environmental
protection standards and security re-
quirements which are important cost factors
and thus have a direct effect on the com-
petitive situation of individual undertakings,
must be approximated. The same applies to
the differing requirements for the authoriza-
tion of new power stations.
(ii) Monopolies and exclusive rights. It
should be examined whether existing supply
monopolies can be allowed to continue. The
same applies to exclusive rights to use the
supply and interconnected transport
systems, particularly where this affects
customers' ability to obtain supplies from
sources other than their allotted regional
distributer. In addition, exclusive rights to
operate high-voltage grids must be scruti-
nized, again in so far as they affectthe use of
low-cost production sources and the supply
of electricity to distributors under the most
economic conditions. Finally, electricity pro-
ducers themselves are far from free in their
choice of primary energy.
(Hi) Electricity prices and costs. A minimum
degree of harmonization of price and tariff
structures is essential. There is also a need for
transparency with regard to prices to large
customers, production costs of electricity
generation, prices at which electricity is
transferred between national systems and
prices of primary energy sources. Exactly
what is required will have to be assessed in
terms of the role of cost and price transpar-
ency in an open Community market.
(iv) Infrastructure. Ireland and Greece must
be fully integrated into the interconnected
grid system to put them on an equal footing
with the other Member States. Another
aspect worth examining would be the
separation of electricity generation and
operation of the grids (e.g. by setting up
operating companies).ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
It is broadly accepted that at least two impor-
tant energy sources - oil and coal- pollute
the environment. Nuclear energy poses en-
vironment problems of a quite different, but
equally serious, nature concerning reactor
safety and the risks attaching to the transport
and storage of radioactive waste.
The Community finally agreed on maximum
limits for pollutant emissions from power sta-
tions and motor vehicles only after pro-
tracted discussions. New upper limits for
vehicle emissions have meanwhile been
adopted which are considerably more
stringent than the previous ceilings and
make necessary the use of the regulated
three-way catalytic convertor. Lengthy
discussions also took placebefore maximum
emission limits could be agreed for new
large combustion installations.
The consultations for the directives on the
lead content of petrol and the sulphur con-
tent offuel oil were almost equally time-con-
suming. A common feature of all these
measures is that they allow Member States
leeway to adopt more stringent provisions.
The legal basis forthisis the new Article 100a
of the EEC Treaty as amended by the Single
European Act, paragraph 4 of which
authorizes Member States to apply more
rigorous measures on environmental or
health grounds. This raises two questions
relevant to the free movement of goods.
(i) Wi II Member States with stricter standards
allow products meeting the less stringent
criteria of other Community countries into
free circulation in their territory from 1992?
(ii) What will be the effect of differing provi-
sions on the respective imports? Itis already
emerging that imports of products meeting
less rigorous quality criteria are on the in-
crease in Community countries with laxer
standards.
It will beextremelydifficultto implementthe
various provisions introduced into the Treaty
by the Single European Act in sectors such as
energy and environment policy, whose ob-
jectives appear to be at odds with each other.
However, this is just the task set by the
amended Treaty: 'Environmental protection
requirements shall be a component of the
Community's other policies. The Commun-
ity is also required to take as a basis a high
level .of protection, which translates to
stringent statutory provisions (and com-
pliance with them) in all Member States. The
costs this will involve in individual Member
States will differ owing to differences in their
industrial structure. The Commission plans
to relieve the burden in structurally
underdeveloped countries by expanding the
use of natural gas or electricity through co-
financing of infrastructures of Community in-
terest, in order to replace some of the energy
systems based on coal or oil. Nevertheless
there are other issues to be considered.
However much importance is attached to
legitimate environmental concerns, the
Community cannot afford to neglect the
security of supply aspect and the re-
quirements of the internal energy market 
free movement of goods, persons ... . The
same is true of the Community's competitive
situation in international markets. These
divergent goals will have to be' carefully
weighed on the basis of cost-benefit
analyses. The latter will also have to take ac"
count of the social and environmental costs
of the individual energy options, even
though calculating them is extremely dif-
ficult.
Of course, it remains true that the most en-
vi ronment-friendly energy is energy which is
not consumed and therefore does not need
to be generated. This is also the simple
answer to the question of environmental
cost. A survey among US electricity supply
utilities has shown that investments of USD
19000 million would be necessary in the
next 10 years in order to create additional"
capacity of 30000 MW, compared with only
around USD 6 000 million that would ben~eded to save this additional quantity of
electricity through the use of more efficient
equipment (least-cost planning).
While all this may appear obvious, wil-
lingness to conserve energy has dwindled
rapidly in the Community in the last few
years. The 1988 Commission finding still
holds true, that the medium-term objective
of a minimum 20% energy efficiencyim-
provement by 1995 will not be possible if no
new policy measures are introduced at Com-
munity and/or national level. The impressive
improvements of the past - more than 20%
improvement between 1973 and 1982, a
period in which there were two oil crises 
slowed down to a meagre 3% between 1982
and 1988. As the Commission noted in its
autumn 1989 paper on Energy and the En-
vironment (COM(89) 369) 'low energy
prices acting as a disincentive to energy effi-
ciency investments have not changed fun-
damentally in recent years and energy is still
available in abundant quantities, although
this situation is not in line with long-term
expectations
The Commission has therefore taken the in-
itiative. At the end of 1989 it announced the
SAVE programme to improve efficiency of
energy use and energy saving, which is to
concentrate on measures that will yield the
maximum savings fastest. SAVE is designed
to supplement the Thermie programme for
the promotion of technologies to increase
energy efficiency. The Commission has also
proposed a series of measures in other areas
all of which, however, are geared to the same
objective. They include:
(i) efficiency standards for energy
technologies and for appliances;
(ii) speed limits in the Community;
(iii) standards for vehicle fuel consumption;
(iv) measures to improve transport systems,
such as support for public transport in cities;
(v) criteria for insulation standards taking in-
to account the different climatic conditions
in the Community;
(vi) elimination of legal and economic bar-
riers to facilitate and increase sales of heat
and power to energy distributors and
end-users.
The most direct means of getting the market
to pay for the risk of environmental damage
would be to raise energy prices sufficiently
to reflect the full social costs. Higher costs
would make it worthwhile to use energy
more rationally. However, this brings us back
to the problem of how to quantify precisely
the social and environmental costs. The
Commission s approach is to examine the
practicality of fiscal measures as a means of
promoting more rational use of energy. It is
considering the following:
(i) a CO2 tax
(ii) differentiation of existing taxes to reward
energy saving, and
(i ii) a system of 'anticydi cal' taxes to promote
energy efficiency, i.e. higher taxes when
energy prices are low and vice versa.
This, briefly, is what the Commission con-
siders to be the essential framework for an
environmentally responsible energy policy.
What is the situation on the supply side?
What are the advantages and disadvantages
of the various energy sources?
FOSSIL FUELS
The main emissions from fossil fuel use are
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and carbon
dioxide. Energy activities contribute about
90% of man-made SO2 and NOx emissions.
Stationary combustion installations (chiefly
power stations) are the largest source of SO2
emissions, whereas transport is the main
contributor to NOx emissions. Technologies
for the control and reduction of these emis-
sions are available. Post-combustion control
in particular necessitates high investment
cost and occasionally involves increased
energy consumption. The International
Energy Agency has recently estimated that
the capital cost of flue-gas desulphurization
can account for 15% of the total investment
costs for a coal-fired power station. The
transport sector remains an area of concern
for the Commission. Fuel consumption con-tinues to grow, and efficiency improvements
as well as statutory and technical measures
to reduce vehicle emissions are cancelled
out by growing numbers of cars and bigger
car engines.
As yet there are no emission limit values for
the greenhouse gases produced in the com-
bustion of fossil fuels, in particular carbon
dioxide, which is responsible for over 50% of
the greenhouse effect. The following
diagrams show the likely development of the
emissions to the year 2010 in the Com"
munity:
NUCLEAR ENERGY
From the point of view of pollutantemissions
to the air, nuclear energy is indisputably a
clean technology. Nuclear power stations do
not emit any of the greenhouse gases.
However, nuclear energy has social and en-
vironmental costs of a different, no less
critical type. The nuclear fuel cycle itself and
the dismantling of nuclear power stations at
the end of their life create radioactive wastes
which have to be dealt with.
The figures are nevertheless impressive.
Nuclear energy currently accounts for 34%
of electricity production in the Community.
If the 140 or so nuclearreactors in operation
in the Community were closed down and the
electricity they generate had to be produced
from coal, this would result in a further 550
million tonnes of CO2 emissions in addition
to the 785 million tonnes already produced
from the burning of fossil fuels to generate
electricity. CO2 emissions would therefore
increase by 70%. Replacing nuclear energy
by natural gas would increase carbon diox-
ide emissions by 'only' 242 million tonnes.
This relationship applies world-wide. If all
the electricity currently produced in around
430 nuclear reactors throughout the world
were to be generated from coal, the current
global 21 000 million tonnes of CO2 emis-
sions from burning fossil fuels would in-
crease by a further 16000 million tonnes, i.e.
almost four-fifths.Ii2J
On the question of final disposal of radioac-
tive waste, the Commission is confident that
safe solutions can be found. A report by inter-
national experts commissioned by the Com-
munity was presented in the summer of
1988. It concluded that vitrified high-level
waste could be safely disposed of in the
geological formations examined, provided
that appropriate sites were selected and that
repositories were designed and built accord-
ing to sound engineering practice.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions can be drawn from
the analysis of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the various energy sourCes.
Emissions from fossil fuel use will decrease
in the case of SO2 and NOx, but increase in
the case of CO2 unless political measures to
prevent this are taken. As the Commission
notes in its paper on energy and the environ-
ment: 'This is an inevitable consequence of
growth, not only economic growth but also
basic growth of population. The Commis-
sion therefore stresses that it is essential to
continue and intensify efforts to conserve
energy. With regard to the supply side of the
equation, the Commission has put up for
discussion a number of initiatives with a
positive environmental impact.How much longer can we afford to waste energy?OUTLOOK
Efficient production and use of energy .is the
key to future primary energy consumption.
Energy intensity in .the comingdecades will
be determined by the interaction of prices,
technology, capital availability and en-
vironmental constraints. The dominant
themes of the 1990s are the internal energy
market and the environment.
Security of supply, energy production and
consumption must be reconciled with a
steady improvement in environment quality.
The internal energy market will provide a
stimulus to economic activity and create a
more favourable business climate. It will pro-
vide the basis through economic growth for
the development of more efficient
technologies, facilitate penetration of these
technologies and help to reduce energy con-
sumption through more rational use of
energy. Above all, this will lead to a decline
in emissions.
The three objectives of (i) sustained
economic growth, (ii) a clean environment
and (iii)a secure energy supply at com-
petitive prices are not mutually exclusive.
However, harmonious progress towards
these goals is dependent on an effective com-
mon energy policy.
Energy consumers bear the brunt of the costs of
market compartmentalization which the Commis-
sion estimates at half  percent of gross domestic
product.FURTHER READING
EC PUBLICATIONS
Community energy and completion of the
internal market. Information report.
Rapporteur: M. von der Decken.
Economic and Social Commitee, Brussels,
EC 1988.
Report on European co;J.1 policy.
Rapporteur: Norman West.
European Parliament, Committee on energy,
research and technology. Luxembourg, EP
1988, 39 pp. (PE 116.001/fin,) EP Documents
1988/0147 A2.
The m;J.in findings of the Commission's
review of Member States' energy policies.
The  1995  Community energy objectives.
Commission, Brussels, EC 1988, 2 Vols
137 pp,
COM Documents 1988/174 finalNol. 1-
Terence Daintith, Leigh Hancher:
Energy str;J.tegy in Europe: the leg;J.1
framework.
European University Institute, Berlin, de
Gruyter, 1986, IX, 190 pp., Series A: Law. 04.
Report on the follow-up to the  1995 
energy objectives.
Rapporteur: Gordon Adam. European
Parliament, Committee on Energy, Research
and Technology, Luxembourg, EP 1987
21 pp. (pE 111.365/fin.). EP Documents
1986/242.
Towards  continuing policy for energy
efficiency in the Europe;J.n Community.
, Commission, Brussels, EC 1987, 10 pp.
COM Documents 1987/223 final.
Report on research and energy policy
me;J.sures to counteract the rising
concentration of c;J.rbon dioxide in the
atmosphere (the greenhouse effect).
Rapporteur: James Fitzsimons. European
Parliament, Committee on Energy, Research
and Technology, Luxembourg, EP 1986
EP Documents 1986/68 A2,
Energy efficiency in the EEe.
Commission, Brussels, EC 1985,
Evaluation report on the energy
demonstration progr;J.mme.
Commission, Brussels EC 1985, 48 pp.
COM Documents 1985/29 final/2.
New Community energy objectives.
Commission, Brussels, EC 1985
38 pp. + Annex,
COM Documents 1985/245 final.
Member States' energy policies: m;J.in issues
for the future.
Commission, Brussels, EC 1984, 10 pp.
COM Documents 1984/693 final.
Draft Council Regulation (EEC) amending
Regulation (EEc) No 1056/72 on notifying
the Commission of investment projects of
interest to the Community in the petroleum
natural gas and electricity sectors.
COM 89/335,
Proposal for a Council Directive on the
transit of natural gas through the major
systems,
COM (89) 334 final.
Towards completion of the internal market
for natural gas.
Communication from the Commission
COM (89) 334.
Amendment to the proposal for a Council
Decision concerning the adoption of a
community action programme for improving
the efficiency of electricity use.
COM (89) 22.
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC)
concerning the promotion of energy
technology in Europe.
COM (89) 121 final;
COM (89) 121 final/2 of 4. 1989.
European technologies for energy
management - Thermie programme
(Communication from the Commission).
COM (89) 021/1.Transparency of consumer energy prices
(Communication from the Commission),
COM (89) 123 final;
COM (89) 123 final/2 of 30.5.1989.
Evaluation of technological programmes in
the field of energy.
(Communication from the Commission to
the Council).
COM (89) 164.
Amendment to the proposal for a Council
Regulation (EEC) c::oncerning the promotion
of energy technology in Europe - Thermie.
COM (90) 89 final.
Official Journal C 111, 5.5.1990 p, 13.
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC)
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2592/79
laying down rules for carrying out the
registration of crude oil imports in the
Community provided for in Regulation (EEC)
No 1893/79.
COM (90) 43 final.
Energy and the environment
(Communication from the Commission to
the Council).
COM (89) 369 final.
Nuclear industries in the Community, the
nuclear power station design and
construction industry and completion of the
European single market (update of the
illustrative nuclear programme for the
Community - PINC, adopted by the
Commission in 1984 under Article 40 of the
Euratom Treaty and published in 1985
together with the opinion of the ESC),
COM (89) 347 final.
Proposal for a Council Directive on the
transit of electricity through transmission
grids.
COM (89) 336 final - Syn 207.
Increased intra-Community electricity
exchanges. A fundamental step towards
completing the internal energy market
(Communication from the Commission).
COM (89) 336,
Draft Council Directive c::oncerning a
Community procedure to improve the
transparency of gas and electricity prices
charged to industrial end-users.
COM (89) 332.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Energy policies in an uncertain world.
Ed. by Peter Pearson, Basingstoke,
Macmillan 1989, XXXI, 113 pp.
j. G. van der Linde, R. Lefeber:
D 'International Energy Agency captures the
development of European Community
energy law
journal of world trade.
1988, 22/05, pp. 5-25.
The list of obstacles  to  be overcome 
complete the single energy market. An
initial European Commission analysis.
Suppl. a: EEC energy policy and the single
market of 1993.
Brussels, Prometheus 1988, 89 pp,
Buckens M. M.
EEC energy policy and the single market of
1993.
Suppl.: the list of obstacles to be overcome
to complete the single energy market.
Brussels, Prometheus 1988, Iv, 382 pp.
Daintith T., Hancher L.:
D 'The management of diversity: Community
law as an instrument of energy and other
sectoral policies
Yearbook of European law,  1984, 04
pp. 123-167.
Andries M.
The EEC and energies of the future.
Brussels, European News Agency 1985, III
45 pp, + annexes (VI),
Audland C. J.
D 'European Community energy strategy and
its legislative implications
journal of Energy and Natural Resources
Law.
Vol. 1. No. , 1983, pp. 9-20,
Pearce D. W, Westoby R.
Britain within the European Community.
The way forward.
London ed. by Ali M. EI-Agraa, Macmillan
1983, pp. 187-212.The European Community energy options
in  1983.
Survey prepared by Marie Martine Buckens.
Brussels, European News Agency 1983
217 pp., ann. Europe in 1983,
Maull, Hans:
Europe and world energy.
London, Sussex European Research Centre:
Butterworths 1980, VIII, 342 pp" Bibliogr,
Butterworths European studies
Turner L.:
European and Japanese energy po/ides.
Carman Guy de, Pinder j.
The European alternatives: the Community
energy policy: oil.
0 "Europaische Energie- und Umweltpolitik
fUr das Ruhrgebiet!'
Europa und das Ruhrgebiet.
Duisburg: Braun 1988, 146 pp.
Reichert K.
0 "Energiepolitik"
Jahrbuch der Europaischen Integration.
1983, pp. 178-184.
"Comentarios a la legislaci6n comunitaria.
Revista de derecho privado,  torno 09, 1987.
Dir, por Molina del Pozo c.F., Madrid:
Editoriales de Derecho Rernides (Edersa),
1987 - Vol. 
Tomo 9: Polftica de transportes, Politica de
energia,
Comentado par Gonzales-Blanch Roca F.
Solofranca Sanchez-Neyra j, I., (e, ), 1987
, 915 pp,
"La politique de I'energie de la CEE dans la
perspective du marche unique de 1993"
Bruxelles: Prometheus 1989, V, 397 p. +
annexe "Le marche interieur de I'energie"
(document de travail deja Commission
27. 4. 1988).
Blumann c., joly G,
0 ,&nergie et Communautes europeennes"
Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen.
1984 20/04, p. 571-642.
Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen.
1986, 22/04, p. 613-680
Touscoz j.
"Quelle politique energetique pour
Europe? Propositions pour une relance".
tnergie  et  sodete  (LXGOSCE).
Grenoble, Institut economique et juridique
de I'energie.
Grenoble: PUG 1986, 153 pp., Bibliogr.
p. 133-147,
Herbes j" Touscoz J. (e.
"L'Europe et la cooperation internationale
dans Ie domaine energetique"
Actes du colloque internationale organise
par /'Institut pour Ie developpement de la
cooperation internationale.
Lefeber R., van der Linde j. G, (avec bibliogr.
"Europese integratie vergt een energie(k)
beleid..
Sodaal-economische wetgeving.  1987
35/06, p. 452-470.
juricic A:
Financieringsactie van de Europese
Gerneenschap in de energiesector,
Kwarlaaloverzicht van de economie.
1985/03 Dossiers p. 67-84,
Belaud J.F.:
Energie: actions finanderes et politiques de
la eEE.
Bruxelles, Agence europeenne
informations 1985, Xlv, 212 p. + annexe
(VI),
Andries M.
La  CEE  et  les energies du futur.
Bruxelles: Agence europeenne
informations 1985, III, 46 p, + annexe.
"Les choix energetiques de la Communaute
en 1983"
Dossiers de l'Europe  en 1983. 04,
Dossier prep. par Marie-Martine Buckens
Brussels, European News Agency 1983, 216
5 pp.European Communities - Commission
ENERGY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(fourth edition)
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
1991 ~ 45 pp, - 16,2 x 22.9 cm
European Documentation series  7/1990
ISBN 92-826-1737-
Catalogue number: CB-56-89-538-EN-
This booklet for non-specialists discusses the energy situation of the Community and the outlook to the
year 2000.